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*The Dualism of Fact
and Idea in Its Social
Implications* :: :: ::

By
ERNEST LYNN TALBERT

PHILOSOPHIC STUDIES

ISSUED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

NUMBER 2

CHICAGO
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
1910

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THE DUALISM OF FACT AND IDEA
IN ITS SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS

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Published February 1910

Composed and Printed By
The University of Chicago Press
Chicago, Illinois, U. S. A.

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SUMMARY

The aim of this thesis is as follows:

1. To state the general method of solving a definite problem as defined by that type of logical theory for which thought is practical, constructive, and purposive.

2. To suggest philosophical and social implications of the dualism of "fact" and "idea" within a problem. The implications are that emphasis of the "fact" is the philosophical attitude of empiricism, and the social attitude of the "occupation;" the emphasis of the idea is the philosophical attitude of rationalism, the social attitude of the "profession."

3. To show how the features of logical method and the corollaries of theoretical and practical attitudes serve to explain and to criticize the standpoints of Hegel and Karl Marx. Hegel is regarded as a rationalist, an idealizer of the "profession," and the established; Karl Marx adopts the general rationalistic framework, but uses it to denounce the "profession" and the conventional, and to support the supremacy of the "occupation." At the same time he seeks to incorporate the empirical into his system and incurs the logical difficulty of fixating the "fact."

4. To illustrate the failure of the Marxian logical formulas in the light of succeeding events.

5. To describe the change in theory and practice resulting thereby.

6. To indicate the possibilities of the constructive attitude applied to some present social problems, by outlining factors in the situations producing them, and the means adopted for their solution.

7. To relate the constructive logical method to the theory of democracy.

I. CHARACTERISTICS OF FUNCTIONAL LOGIC

That thought is teleological, reconstructive, and "practical" is an ancient doctrine; but reinforced and enriched by the contributions of modern biology and psychology, one school of logicians has given the purposive element of thinking a fresh significance. Whatever shortcomings may exist in the standpoint of the "experimental" or "instrumental" type of logical theory considered from the angle of the metaphysician's conception of the ultimate nature of thought, it remains true that a suggestive attempt has been made to explain daily processes of solving concrete difficulties in a manner more immediately understandable and applicable than the deductive subsumptive method of the formal logic. What has been lost of symmetry and certitude has been compensated for, in the view of the instrumentalists, by the illumination coming from a flexible working method of interpreting and acting upon new situations.

A noteworthy feature of the scanty literature of the functional logic, so called, is its insistence upon the relative, shifting, and historical character of "fact" and "idea" within the bounds of a definite emergency.¹ It is contended that any real crisis calling for an escape from contradiction and uncertainty is due to a failure of the habitual way of acting or thinking to function adequately under the pressure of new stimuli. The starting-point of a logical problem is always an "objective situation" within which reflective thought works. This situation can be explained biologically as structure needing adaptation to novel demands; psychologically, as an old response needing mediation. The temporary moving equilibrium is disturbed by constant shifting of interest and attention: the old habit fails, and doubt, uncertainty, and tension ensue; the breaking-up of habitual response is signalized by the emergence of a more or less intense consciousness of the strain. The best words to characterize consciousness are reconstructive activity. Within the reconstructive process, treated logically, arises a bifurcation into "fact," the given, the "data," and "idea," the tentative "meaning." The initial facts are not immutable; the problem comes to consciousness because they need to be interpreted and acted upon; there is a projecting of possible plans of action and a selection of the universal which serves as most adequate control, and a "testing," a verifica-

¹ The following is an interpretation of the opening chapters in *Studies in Logical Theory*.

tion in application. The subject of the judgment denotes stimulus, the coming to focus of perceptual elements inconsistent with previous habit; the predicate represents the appropriate response. The judgment is hypothetical because under the dominion of definite conditions, and it finds its test of adequacy, of universality, in the resumption of blocked-up movement, in comprehension and control of all the elements entering into the problem.

Some features essential to the discussion which follows may be pointed out:

1. It is important to note the place assigned to reflection in the logical procedure. The results of biology and anthropology are utilized: mind has developed in intimate connection with fundamental racial necessities.¹ Thought is a "tool," a "means of manipulation," an economizing, directing activity, not an implanted instinct; it is an analytic and synthetic instrument designed to co-ordinate and evaluate when instincts, ways of acting, conflict.² In one sense, intellect is degraded as compared with the formal logician's description of "pure reason." The judgment is not regarded as a "necessary" coalescence of ideas: in the eyes of the experimentalists the predicate is not "given": it is earned. Reason is not pure in the ascetic sense of abhorring sense-data: following Hegel, the plea is that categories develop with the process of thinking in response to opposition: they are re-formed by means of the conflict.

From another point of view, thought is assigned an enviable position, in organic relation to will and feeling. Thinking is a mediation of impulse, and the "personal equation," sympathy, imagination, and interest are involved as factors determining any concrete result. Moreover, this type of logic can recognize the vast rôle of the "group consciousness," the individually unconscious. Consciousness is not merely individual. It is social from beginning to end, although passing through the variation of the individual; reflection is therefore a focusing activity utilizing the unconscious and habitual within a social medium. The significance of thought is that it controls the immediate direction of change in a most economical manner, secures a balancing of impulsive tendencies and consequently a more correlated expenditure of effort.

2. A clean-cut division between a world of fact and a world of meaning is not accepted: the distinction is valid only as a historical one existing during a definite emergency. For the disciples of the new logic there is no brute world of scientific fact, mechanism, and causation confronted with a

¹ Tufts, *Garman Studies*, pp. 28 ff.; Jerusalem, *Gedanken und Denker*, pp. 138 ff.

² Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, Vol. I, chap. i.

teleological, spiritual world of meanings: science, fact, data, for them serve to state the conditions under which purposive conduct must go on; the means are an integral part of the end, and change with the problem at hand.

3. The test of the successful solution of a problem is not a reference back to the facts unchanged; neither is it an appeal to a law, a predicate, already made and controlling. The test is a part of the whole activity—the initial facts becoming suffused with “meaning,” and the universal which served to direct a previous reaction becoming reconstructed in order to fit into a wider situation.

4. Corresponding to an active belief in the general related character of the physical universe (the presupposition of the physical scientist), the experimental logician thinks that one who attempts to apply intelligence to the control of social conditions assumes belief in “the essentially social character of human impulse and endeavor,”¹ his object being, not to convert naturally egoistic propensities into social ones, but to allow the social nature of human activity to express itself under favorable conditions.

Summarizing the chief tendencies of this school of logical theory, it may be said that according to the experimentalists the need for thought traces back to an “objective situation” which has become tensional and problematic. Thought is a reconstructive activity; it is “reality advancing” in nature; it is forward looking, and does work. The predicate or hypothesis represents simplification, control, and universality. One may hypostatize either the “facts” and consider them changeless, or the supposedly immutable and transcendent “idea.” In the former case, there is no satisfactory explanation of the way in which universals can be derived from the handling of facts, however skilful the manipulation; the start is made from perceptual data, but the constructive predicate process is skipped. Since hypothesis-making is discouraged, the universal, as with Mill,² must be somehow already there, in “laws of nature;” the immediate organic interrelation of hypothesis and fact is not realized, and finally meaning remains separate from the process of judging. In the latter case, truth is something already fixated; and universality, necessity, and self-evidency are not convincingly correlated with the concrete act of judging;³ if changeless validity resides in a system of relations already categorized, there is some difficulty in explaining the manifestly constructive character

¹ Mead, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. V, p. 370.

² *System of Logic*, Book III, chaps. iii–iv; Book III, chap. xiv, sec. 4; Ashley, *Studies in Logical Theory*, pp. 160 ff.

³ Sigwart, *Logic*, Vol. I, pp. 27, 28; cf. Bradley, *Logic*, p. 10.

of our thinking and how variations from the habitual copy the transcendent truth. Unity is attained by sacrificing manyness.

These three conceptions taken from logical method, viz.: (1) the present concrete universality of judgment, (2) the immediate value of thinking for the control of conditions, and (3) the interrelation of fact and idea within a problem, will be employed to interpret and criticize the logic underlying important social problems and the means adopted for their solution. Preliminary to the discussion, some general implications of the logical dualism of fact and idea must be considered.

II. GENERAL SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE DUALISM OF FACT AND IDEA

The implications are twofold. Emphases of the function of fact and idea embody themselves in the philosophical and social attitudes known as empiricism and rationalism. Again, these attitudes are correlated with concrete functions which groups perform in carrying on the activities of an organized society. The object of this section is to relate the logical standpoints to social interests and their theoretical expression.

1. Broadly viewed, empiricism is the emphasis of the individual fact; rationalism, the emphasis of the universal idea. For the present purpose empiricism may be defined as the tendency to shun all species of postulated and necessary principles: it is hostile to all that is innate and a priori—to vested interest, prejudice, and dogma. Rationalism¹ is a tendency to guard achieved universals, rigid standards of truth, and the organized in every sphere: the reality of the One, the unification of consciousness, the soul, the state, and the church, are its themes.

2. The ground of the struggle between the upholders of the fact and the defenders of the idea in society may be stated in terms of the difference of interest in the "occupations" as compared with the "professions." By occupations are meant those daily interests which engage the attention of men, which serve their physical wants, and, as much as may be, their intellectual needs, but which are not of superior prestige and are not, for the time being, protected and fostered by the community to any such degree as are the professional interests. The latter represent a worked-out technique, the solidification of mind, as it were. They are social concepts organized into a machinery of public activity and sheltered by all the laws and conventions of the group concerned. The professional classes are, of course, the "leisure" ones—not necessarily in the sense that full service is not performed, but in the sense that the time, discipline, and acquisition of specialized knowledge and dexterity involved in apprenticeship are compensated for by special prerogatives, social esteem, and exemption from

¹ Rationalism is a term of varied content. It may mean the attained universal, or the process of reaching a new universal; one is reason as authority, the other reason against authority. Lecky (*Rationalism in Europe*, Vol. I, p. 16) and Benn (*History of Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century*, Vol. II, p. 421) confine themselves to the latter meaning. Usage (3) distinguished in the article "Rationalism," in Baldwin's *Dictionary* corresponds with the meaning adopted above.

the monotonous activities which engage a great deal of the attention of the more unspecialized and less socially recognized and protected occupational modes of life. The distinction is itself a shifting one historically. For example, the manufacturing class raised to importance by the inventions ushering in the industrial revolution, was at first an "occupational" interest which had to fight its way against the semi-feudal "professional" prestige of the English landlords. Now, the subordinate partners in the complex economic organization which has developed in all industrially advanced countries—the working class, the Fourth Estate—are striving for recognition, and opposed to them stand the hierarchy of those who occupy controlling and sanctioned places in the "capitalistic" system of production and distribution. This contrast is important in its bearings on the Marxian criticism of modern society, discussed in the succeeding section.

That the occupational classes become dissatisfied, and direct attention to the "facts" of their lot, that they become more or less united dissenters from the established usages of a conventionalized state and its "professional" retainers, is as certain as the universal reaction of the vested interests in the way of upholding strenuously the sacredness of the subjective and objective norms upon which their supremacy is based. The underlying reason for the struggle runs back to the psychological and social origin of specialized activities. It will be remembered that mind was defined as a superior method of controlling departures from the usual, a selective agent for securing control of environment. In primitive times, the exigencies of communal living were the driving forces determining the direction of social change, and attention was directed to the bridging-over of the crises inevitable in the precarious state of early peoples; the crafty medicine man, the intrepid hunter, and the old "wise" man who remembered tradition were rewarded according to their natural endowments and acquired aptitudes, because of their superior ability to deal with unexpected happenings or to conserve the useful communal customs.¹ With the accumulation of resources, conquest of weaker tribes, the rise of a court and a political and religious hierarchy, there appeared a definite stratification of classes, and universally similar results followed. The professional groups kept apart from the common ranges of activity, except on extraordinary occasions, threw around themselves the cloak of ceremony and taboo, and rested on their superior acquisitions of skill and knowledge; while the "lower" strata were bound down to routine, deprived of the opportunities of initiative, and forced to perform the unilluminated labor making possible the leisure of the official groups. Wherever this situation exists, a twofold misfortune

¹ Cf. Thomas, *The Medicine Man and the Professional Occupations*.

appears: the significance of the whole life is lost, both to the professional keepers of the "idea," and to those who represent the factual unorganized "matter." The professional groups, absorbed in perfecting and preserving technique and established norms, become isolated from the common life. The normal freedom of contact is broken. The "dispossessed" gain, sometimes in stolidity, sometimes in passionate revolt, and at all times in strong distrust of that mode of reasoning the misuse of which they observe in the professional groups above them.¹ They feel dumbly the facts of their unlovely destiny, facts which to them are without meaning. To the professional group, conversely, thought—the idea—is a thing for itself, not for active reconstruction of the entire society.²

3. Philosophy has many aspects, but out of its possible functions may be distinguished two which are relevant to this discussion: (a) It is a reflective statement of the meaning of individual and communal experience, a summing-up and idealization of what is regarded as most worthful.³ (b) In addition to its idealizing function, which is necessarily prone to accept and rationalize the existent, it has a democratic and active interest in the future: it pleads for a remaking of the real on the score of possible irrationality. It is a negation of the established values.

To separate absolutely the two functions is not justifiable; yet the history of philosophy seems to warrant, in the large, a distinction between types of philosophical attitudes. The first embodies the animus of the rationalist and the "professional" interest; the second, the animus of the empiricist and the "occupational" interest. A consideration of certain features of Greek and modern philosophical development will serve to expand the position taken, as well as to give background for a treatment of Hegel and of the embodiment of the two attitudes in the theory and social circumstances characteristic of his time.

Abstracting from other aspects, Greece affords an example of the rationalistic and professional interest come to philosophical expression.⁴ The dialectic of intellect at first used as a means of social interpretation and reform lost contact with actual problems as the city state decayed. Plato, realizing the instrumental function of the idea, hypostatized it, and

¹ Cf. the evidence collected in Ward, *The Ancient Lowly*.

² Of course, this description is a generalized one, simply suggesting how an initial functional "division of labor" becomes non-functional.

³ McTaggart confines philosophy to this office (*Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 195).

⁴ Cf. Dewey, *Significance of the Problem of Knowledge*; and "Some Stages of Logical Thought," *Philos. Rev.*, Vol. IX, pp. 465 ff.

in his psychology of classes, reserved it for the philosopher kings. With Aristotle, despair of reviving the political greatness of Athens led to a further specialization of intellect; thinking became a fascinating pursuit for its own sake, and the magnanimity of the philosopher could not conceal disdain for the artisan and the slaves by nature. The "occupational" interests after Socrates did not find adequate expression, as they did in the modern empirical development.

The plain historical account of the English empiricist was largely motivated by human interests. Innate ideas stood for hereditary privileges, violation of rights, and uncriticized concepts. The liberals, the Utilitarian reformers, used the logic of the fact: they were protesters, and to serve their purposes simplified unduly the individual and society. They were better destroyers than builders, and found it easier to observe the unfortunate facts than to organize and put meaning into them. As a whole, they took the anti-professional stand, although it is true that when their demands were incorporated into the social technique, the possessors of the privileges secured became in turn the conservative and professional groups.

On the continent, where the sway of Greek rationalism, Roman organization, and scholastic doctrine was more marked, reflective thought linked itself to the structure of control and to the sacredness of an organized consciousness and institutions. The rationalist denied that chaotic sensations, however associated, could explain the depths of the inner life. Individuality, consciousness, could not be resolved into the impulsive reaction and mechanical sequences of the empiricists. For the rationalist there was always present a more inclusive Self, a universalizing something, whether in existing secular institution or in transcendent spiritual forces, which served as a standard of reference for the fleeting moment. The individual could always escape from his isolation and find support and consolation in a system of relations, a realm of ideas, which although lying outside his fluid states of consciousness, yet gave permanence and validity to them. Hence arose a certain detachment from the practicality of daily experience, a refined form of scholastic other-worldliness, and, on the whole, from Descartes, an interest in one phase of social control, the religious. In the course of a suggestive study,¹ Bush remarks: "Was it not inevitable that, not nature and man as humanly experienced, but the soul, the world and the deity as metaphysically conceived, should be the theme of 'modern philosophy'? - Why be surprised that the metaphysics based on the concept of consciousness seems to have more to do with some other world than

¹ *Essays, Philosophical and Psychological* (James Memorial Volume), p. 101.

with this one? It is the pride of idealism that, instead of guiding the work of actual knowledge, instead of throwing helpful light on the technique of discovery, this type of philosophy issued in religious metaphysics." The rationalist asserted the value of order, of the general, of the sequence of "psychical heredity" as opposed to the caprice of variation, and was thus admirably fitted to serve as the exponent of an organized society with its established usages, professional functions, and regulating norms.¹

It is not presumed that this brief characterization of the "professional" attitude in Greek and modern continental thought as opposed to the empirical development represents anything more than one tendency: and the cross currents and innumerable combinations of individualistic and rationalistic tendencies in the various thinkers make anything more than a composite picture impracticable. There is no attempt, of course, to minimize the supreme value of the continental probing into the mysteries and complexities of consciousness; the philosophical significance of its analysis is not denied when one insists upon the fact that philosophical reflection is one phase of a vaster social experience. The main thing, which writers from other points of view have often noted, is to detect the connection between the logician who treats the predicate idea as already formulated—the type of thought insistent upon the philosopher king's exclusive possession of real insight—and the high value placed upon those professional activities in society which partake of organization and consistency of working. This tendency of thought may become anti-social and reactionary in so far as it contends, in whatever guise of dogma, divine right, or vested interest, that the already formulated is permanent and "given" for all time because it seems universal, necessary, and self-evident. Its purity of thought and sacredness of institution may be secured by sacrificing more inclusive ideas and controlling devices. Similarly, the harking-back, on the part of the empiricist, to initial "facts," a supposedly unchangeable subject of the judgment, may lead to a static universal outside the reconstructive process. This is the logical flaw in all revolutionary and atomistic attitudes—adherence to chosen facts and their partial meanings and a consequent overlooking of the control value of the existing formulation, or at least the right of such formulation to enter into the new reconstruction.

¹ Cf. Moore, *Jour. Philos. Psych. and Sci. Methods*, Vol. VI, pp. 291 ff.

III. THE SYSTEMS OF HEGEL AND MARX AS EMBODIMENTS OF THE SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF LOGICAL METHOD

The social implications of logical attitudes are admirably displayed in the philosophy of Hegel and its reaction, the socialistic system of Marx and his followers. Hegel touched the goal of continental rationalism,¹ for by reason of its comprehensiveness, its symmetry, and its self-consistent unfoldment, there appeared no secure place in his view for the variational, the untried and experimental; since whenever a presentation became conscious at all, it was in the clutches of necessary and relentless laws of spirit. There was nothing of the looseness and tentative character of English empiricism: the implicit and immanent Idea must maintain its absolute supremacy. The world to Hegel was one of meaning, and since meaning is relation, that which is organized and ordered must have inner justification and sacredness. To attain a definite present purpose implies want, dissatisfaction, the maladjustment of the habitual and customary; and since for Hegel it is the supreme purpose to attain a coalescence of existence and meaning in a sole reality, that incompleteness which besets our phenomenal world of baffled endeavor and experimental science is hard to reconcile with the eternal perfection of a self-perpetuating organization, the Absolute Idea.² At least, it seemed to the enthusiasts for a positive union of reflective attitude and social welfare that Hegel had reduced a world of struggling men to a march of unreal categories.³ The man in whose writing and

¹ Certainly there was no severer critic of the mediaeval and Spinoza type of rationalism than Hegel. Yet his perfected idealism was a form of rationalism in that the evolution of reality was taken to be a self-unfolding of mind. The first and fundamental concepts and laws which earlier rationalism had set up to be deductively employed as revelations of truth, Hegel regarded as incomplete stages of the realization of the immanent Idea which guarantees the teleological process. By including all temporal and phenomenal moments within the sweep of reason, of relation, he, of course, was able to incorporate science and historical sequence within the absolute self; the empirical became in varying degree "illusion." Cf. conclusion to the article, "Rationalism," in Baldwin's *Dictionary*; James, *Hibbert Journal*, October, 1908, p. 71; Windelband, *Die Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*, Vol. II, p. 302.

² *Logic*, chap. i.

³ For the post-Hegelian reaction, cf. Rae, *Contemporary Socialism*, chap. iv; Wallace, article "Hegel" in *Enc. Brit.*; Höfding, *The History of Modern Philosophy*, Vol. II. pp. 266 ff.; Engels, *Feuerbach, The Roots of the Socialist Philosophy*, pp. 52 ff.; Seligman, *Economic Interpretation of History*, chaps. ii and iii.

“propaganda” the post-Hegelian reaction worked out most concrete social effects was Karl Marx, the leader and inspirer of one of the significant popular movements of modern times.¹ The socialist standpoint as a world-philosophy rests upon a logic of social reform and offers, in contrast with the Hegelian system, a point of approach to an interpretation of many-sided social problems. The pertinent points of analogy and contrast may be distinguished as follows:

1. There is in each an insistence upon friction and antithesis as essential moments in the journey to synthesis.² Both Hegel and Marx profess to think in teleological terms: the Hegelian logic of reality is guided and drawn by the immanent force of the complete Form, the Notion, just as the war of the classes in Marxian phrase must lead by inner necessity to the goal of the co-operative commonwealth after the bitter antithesis of capitalist and laborer.

2. In each system lurks an element of fatalism.³ The Absolute after all does not depend upon finite struggle and achievement,⁴ and the material dialectic of economic environment seems to arise spontaneously from the soil. In Hegel thought as the sole reality is portrayed in its reconstructive, teleological character, but without organic intimacy with human purposes; laws, arts, religion, and institutions come into being somehow as realizations of the deeper Idea, just as in the Marxian inversion of the spiritual dialectic they are epiphenomena of an evolving economic substratum.⁵ The sweep and inevitableness of the evolution resembles the close-knit symmetry and impressiveness of the rationalistic standpoint: there is an imputed end controlling the functions of society, an organization (so vividly appreciated by Hegel) not dependent upon the chance desire of the wayward individual. Whether or not one wills it, the economic evolution goes on; the advance of the machine industry is given an impersonal and cosmic character; there is rigid necessity of the present capitalistic

¹ Stein, *Die sociale Frage*, pp. 288 ff.; Wallace, *Lectures and Essays*, chap. viii; Höffding, *Ethik*, pp. 303 ff.; Ritchie, *Natural Rights*, p. 276; Barth, *Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie*, pp. 270 ff.; Bonar, *Philosophy and Political Economy*, pp. 280 ff.

² Adamson, *Development of Modern Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 271 ff.

³ Russell, *German Social Democracy*, chap. i; Veblen, *Quart. Jour. Economics*, Vol. XX, p. 580.

⁴ *Logic*, p. 352.

⁵ Labriola, *Socialism and Philosophy*, p. 60. Representative utterances of Marx are found in *Capital* (translation, London, 1901) Preface, pp. xxviii ff., and *Misère de la philosophie* (Paris, 1896), p. 143. Cf. Engels, *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, for an elaboration of the Marxian position.

régime, and the inner contradictions of the system prepare the way for the succeeding stage in the social dialectic.¹

3. Although from the standpoint of the Absolute Teleology with its predetermined culminating point, both systems appear quietistic and fatalistic, from another standpoint they are both revolutionary. Hegel could only free himself from radicalism by assuming that the previous self-determinations of the Idea in history found peace and satisfaction in the organization of the Prussian government. It is not true to say, as have over-zealous critics, that Hegel indiscriminately eulogized all the arrangements of the bureaucratic society of his day: yet it is true that he was so much the son of his own time that devices that were not entirely rational were pronounced real. However that may be, the restless triads of Hegel's logic do not create the impression of conservatism as regards the solution of any problem, because there is advanced no convincing assurance that any final synthesis will ever obviate the necessity of further reconstruction. As already observed, Marx cast his social philosophy in the forms of the Hegelian trinitarian process, and notwithstanding the certitude of inevitable transition from the negative moment of capitalism to the synthesis in socialism, and the consequent futility of human choice as a really effective force, the practical consequence was a war-cry—the oppressed were to throw off their chains by denouncing the *bourgeoisie*, by securing political power and thus entering upon the classless society. How such “propaganda” and energy could appreciably affect the predetermined dissolution of the present capitalistic moment of the dialectic was not clearly explained. In both systems are the same antinomies between our human purposes and a final purpose. The human purposes constantly reach out to richer and wider regions of conquest; the final purpose which our human endeavors “copy” is attained in an Absolute Self or an Absolute Society.²

4. The distinction already made between the profession and the occupation forms one feature of the thought of Hegel and a major motive in the Marxian indictment of society. Hegel took a view of the prerogatives

¹ *Capital*, p. 512.

² The mixture of fatalism and “propaganda” to achieve immediate converts is a basis for one type of religious attitude which Mohammedanism has found useful; and the inability to copy an Absolute purpose and identify it with a concrete purpose was the basis of Hegelian mysticism in which “contradictions” were transcended.

Jaurès points out the religious fervor of Marx in showing the inexorable dissolution of the capitalistic régime. Marx also had a few racial and temperamental traits similar to the Hebrew prophets of woe. For personal characteristics cf. Liebknecht's *Memoirs of Marx*. Cf. Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 7, for a statement of the religious character of socialism; also Le Bon, *Psychology of Socialism*, pp. 85 ff.

and value of the philosopher and the ruling classes which, in spite of the eighteenth-century wave of democracy, allied him with the Platonic-Aristotelian standpoint. It is the business of the thinker to exhaust the meaning of the Real.¹ A statement, characteristic of one side at least of his teaching, is found in his *Philosophy of Religion*:²

Philosophy forms in this connection a sanctuary apart, and those who serve in it constitute an isolated order of priests who must not mix with the world, and whose work is to protect the possessions of Truth. How the actual present-day world is to find its way out of this state of disruption, and what form it is to take, are questions which must be left to itself to settle, and to deal with them is not the immediate practical business and concern of philosophy.

Following out his conviction of the supreme function of pure reason, in his *Philosophy of Right* he estimates the classes in the community according to their degree of reflective ability: the "substantial" class follow a way of life needing but little reflection and slightly modified by subjective volition;³ the "industrial" class, involved in more complex relationships, develop a sense of individuality and a desire of freedom, while the fully reflective class are concerned with the universal interests of society, must be free from the direct task of providing for themselves, and should be rewarded and protected by the state.⁴ The utility of the prince and constitutional monarchy in effecting the predominance of the reflective and administrative orders is fully recognized.⁵

Marx, and the socialists generally, to offset the eulogy of the professional and administrative classes, saw the rising strength and possibilities of the mass of workers brought into prominence by the industrial revolution—men who had hitherto counted little in the active control of the state. Their labor seemed to him of immense significance: far greater indeed than that of the professions. These—churchman, lawyer, professor, philosopher, and state official—Marx considered "ideologists," worshipers of a non-functional reason, a sheltered parasitic group who strive to continue the capitalistic era of exploitation.⁶ Instead of idealizing and entrenching the

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, Preface.

² Vol. III, p. 151.

³ Dyde's translation, p. 200.

⁴ *Philosophy of Right*, p. 202.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 278.

⁶ Cf. the eloquent denunciation in the first section of the *Communist Manifesto*. Joseph Dietzgen, whom Marx called the philosopher of the socialist movement, develops this phase of the Marxian doctrine. Cf. his *Philosophical Essays*, pp. 226 ff., and the *Positive Outcome of Philosophy*, *passim*.

customary norms, he used his Hegelian schema to give to the Fourth Estate a sense of historical position, a consciousness of occupational function, which hitherto had belonged to the professional estates. He strove to enlarge the sphere of effective political persons and it is not strange that *Labor* became the capitalized word of his system. The meaning of the world was to be no longer the exclusive possession of the philosopher of reason in whose eyes the rational and real mirrors the Absolute and justifies the permanence of the already established; instead, the workingman was set in the center of the historic drama—the workingman, who by his strategic position is destined to objectify the final co-operative and synthetic stage of the social process. Thus the “occupational” interests become meaningful; monotonous toil, insufficient wage, “exploitation” by the capitalist, diligence through the discipline of the machine industry, are the very means by which the workers achieve a “class consciousness,” ability to co-operate, and political power; ancient territorial wars are outdone by the war of profession against occupation, of “*bourgeoisie*” against “proletariat.”

5. The nature of a specific logical problem according to the view of the instrumentalists, suggests some limitations to the all-sufficiency of the Hegelian and Marxian attitudes. In general it may be said that both positions fall short because of a false emphasis placed either upon the factual or upon the ideational moment in the interaction of subject and predicate, and a failure to hold fast to the historical and relative ascendancy which now one and now the other assumes. There results an imperfect assimilation of rationalistic and empirical presuppositions and in so far as the organic relation of fact and idea is not grasped, all the consequences of one-sided statements of logical procedure, adduced in the previous sections, obtain. In either standpoint there is a dependence upon some kind of “given.” In the Hegelian the given is psychical, the implicit Idea. The facts of the empirical world of science and struggle are soon transcended: only the rational is real, and whether that rationality is of our finding or of another type of consciousness is a moot point in Hegelian interpretation. At any rate, although the process of hypothesis-making is acutely analyzed, we are left with consistency, residing in thought itself, as our test of truth. We begin and end with thought and are never quite sure whether our idea corresponds with or “mirrors the Notion.” Correspondingly, in so far as Marx depends upon the spiritual logic of Hegel to establish the truth of his faith in the Absolute Society we are never quite confident how it is that our empirical purposes are instrumental in leading us thither. But Marx has another weapon in his equipment. For practical purposes of propa-

ganda he uses the empirical presuppositions.¹ The immediately real he derives from two sources: first, the conversion of the dialectic of reason to economic material, and second, the Utilitarian-French reliance upon the manipulation of concrete sense-data, the significance of which he was quite as much unable to explain because given, as were the English liberals. Either position landed him in a difficulty of explaining the immediate problem on its own merits, without appealing to the empirical "laws of nature"² or the rationalistic realm of already formulated meaning beyond the act of judgment. The ancient dualism of a world of matter, of fact, and a world of meaning, of idea, confronted him. Hence arose his often criticized "materialism." It must be repeated that "materialism" may proceed alike from rationalistic and from empirical grounds: one may rely upon psychical givens or factual givens, in so far as there is a cutting-short of the cycle of a complete act and a resting upon one moment of the experience as exhausting the significance of the problem at hand. Materialism simply denies the progressive unfolding of meaning in the specious present and may exist within a teleological or a mechanical system, when the functional character of the mechanism and the purpose is lost sight of.

A proof of the borrowing of empirical postulates of natural rights, hedonistic calculus, and the abstract individual—the devices of the English reformers—is seen in the Marxian conception of human nature.³ Both

¹ Foxwell, in the Introduction to his translation of Menger's *Right to the Whole Product of Labor* (London, 1899), overemphasizes the English contribution, pp. xxv ff. For general criticisms of the limitations of the individualistic standpoint, cf. Veblen, *Quart. Jour. Economics*, Vol. XX, pp. 576, 577, and Vol. XXI, p. 299; Ritchie, *Darwin and Hegel*, chap. vi, and *Natural Rights*, pp. 102, 103 and pp. 268–70; Bonar, *Philosophy and Political Economy*, pp. 186 ff.; Adamson, *Development of Modern Philosophy*, Vol. II, pp. 90, 91; Willoughby, *Social Justice*, chap. v; also Foxwell in Menger, *op. cit.*, Introduction, pp. cvi–cvii.

² It is instructive to notice that in Mill, the mechanical conception of empiricism leads to a sympathy with socialism; cf. his *Logic*, Book VI, chap. xi, sec. 4: "the increasing preponderance of the collective agency of the species over all minor causes is constantly bringing the general evolution of the race into something which deviates less from a *certain and preappointed track*." (Italics mine.)

³ Sombart says, "A word of Pierre Leroux' seems to me as if coined for Marx: 'il était . . . fort pénétrant sur le mauvais côté de la nature humaine.' So it was easy for him to believe in Hegel's teaching that 'evil' has accomplished all the development of mankind"—*Socialism*, p. 92. The Marxian ethical view is seen at its baldest in the coarse allegations of *bourgeois* depravity in the *Manifesto: Capital* is full of undoubtedly correct evidence of inhuman expropriation and fraud; cf. chap. xxi, on the "Genesis of the Industrial Capitalist;" Simkhovitch in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. XIII, p. 200, considers the Marxian concept of ethics; cf. Masaryk, *Grundlagen des Marxismus*, p. 490.

employer and employee "naturally" are dominated by acquisitive propensities: both are "selfish" and anxious to be protected in their rights and prerogatives;¹ there is no hope that truly ethical and social virtues will spring up until "psychological and material" conditions shall be entirely harmonious for "adaptation of inner and outer." There is the same difficulty which Spencer tried to meet: how to evolve a moral individual by adaptation to an environment which, by hypothesis, must evolve separately and build up "representative" ideas and moral dispositions. Of course this is only another way of saying that Marx failed to give prominence to the reaction of active social impulses of the individual upon the enviroing circumstances. He was so impatient of the *bourgeois* "intellectuals" on account of their refusal to respond to the demands of the radicals that he could see no other explanation than that of "economic interest." He concluded that those who direct the industrial machinery inevitably develop predatory class virtues because of their individualistic, competitive exploiting of resources and men: the proletariat, equally self-regarding by nature, are constrained to co-operate with fellow-workers and subordinate private inclination to the welfare of their class. The increasing strength of the proletarian virtues springing from the necessity of group solidarity prepares for the perfect adaptation of the coming society.

This view is utilitarian and criticism of it has been a favorite employment which needs no addition. From the logical point of view, however, it is sufficient to mark the fallacy of assuming that one can deduce *ab extra* from a given set of facts a given set of values or meanings. Of course the central point of ethical theory is that it is precisely the re-forming of the material conditions, the revolt against the "cosmic order" which creates the ethical situation.²

A summary of the matter from the logical standpoint may be put thus: Hegel and Marx did not make clear to the plain man that the essence of theory, of the hypothesis, is brought out in application, in a constant back and forth reaction of concept and percept. It is development, the activity of response, which puts content into any norm. The unreality in the spinning of the Hegelian categories as well as in the delusive symmetry of the Marxian concepts can be traced back to the omission of that phase of logical method in which the hypothesis is applied. If such application does not take place we must be content with unchanging, ready-made fact, mechanism, laws of nature, or given, necessary ideas. Either there is inex-

¹ Cf. Sombart, *Der moderne Kapitalismus*, Vol. I, pp. 378 ff., on "The Genesis of the Capitalistic Spirit."

² Huxley, *Evolution and Ethics*.

orable finality in the mechanism or an inevitable procession of the immanent notion and its objectification in economic stages. Logically speaking, this is the result when the subject is cut away from the predicate; the copula must then be external to the process of solving the problem.

How the failure to reconstruct the predicate, the hypothesis, to correspond with recurring facts has worked in the case of the Marxian theories must now be considered.

IV. INTERACTION OF FACT AND IDEA AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE CHANGES IN MARXIAN DOCTRINES

The purpose of this section is to suggest by reference to typical features of the development of socialist theory and practice that it is not possible to deduce the events of societary evolution conclusively by a logical process. One cannot assume in advance that the facts will follow certain necessary combinations or that the hypotheses will need no remaking: if the subject of judgment is put into motion, as experience demonstrates, the predicate must participate in the struggle and suffer change.

That the history of economic phenomena has not as yet fully substantiated the original Marxian formulation of the inevitable trend it is easy to show.¹ New facts have come to light which cannot, without danger to theoretical consistency, be harmonized with original predictions. To prove the assertion, three points are selected for brief treatment: (1) the alleged tendency to large-scale production, (2) the doctrine of increasing misery, and (3) the socialist view of the present state.²

It was the claim of the *Communist Manifesto*³ and *Capital*⁴ that there is an inevitable and unlimited absorption of the small manufacturer, trader, and farmer by the monopolistic enterprises. This is attended on the part of the worker by a constant relinquishing of the ownership of his "tools," and, on the part of the capitalist, a consequent greater ease of exploiting the "surplus value" produced by labor.⁵ Marx supposed that there would be a sharply drawn antithesis between the propertyless "proletariat" and the *bourgeois* owners of the means of sustaining life.⁶ Such opposition, due to the elimination of the petty producer by large scale production, he welcomed, because by this means the issues would be clearly defined, "class consciousness" fostered, and steps taken by which the dispossessed would enter into their rightful inheritance.

How far have succeeding developments sustained his theory of the

¹ For recent discussions of the departures from strict Marxism see Veblen, *Quart. Jour. Economics*, Vol. XXI, and Simkhovitch, *Pol. Sci. Quart.*, Vol. XIII, pp. 652 ff.

² Marx himself did not, as did his followers, say that tomorrow the new society will begin: but he gave an elaborate logical mold into which, in spite of sporadic aberrations, the economic development was assumed to flow. Cf. Liebknecht's *Karl Marx*, p. 59.

³ *Manifesto* (London), 1888, p. 13.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 738.

⁴ Chaps. xxiv, xxv, esp. pp. 639 ff.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 786.

inevitable trend? At first glance it may seem as if the predictions of Marx and his disciples have come to pass, and it is true that the acuteness of Marx as an economist is proved by his forecast of one line of development, for since his death has come the era of great combinations. Some careful observers, however, have concluded that there are counteracting currents.¹ The testimony of a socialist on this point is relevant. After giving a review of German statistics relating to the growth in size of industrial plants, Bernstein concludes:

Notwithstanding continual changes in industrial groups and in their material arrangements, the picture which presents itself to us today does not indicate that large manufacturing establishments continually devour business units of small and moderate dimensions, but this picture simply shows large business establishments growing up by the side of smaller ones. It is only those establishments so small as to be called dwarf establishments which are suffering an absolute and relative decline. . . .²

If modern society is to break to pieces by reason of the disappearance of the middle classes between the two extremes of the social pyramid, if this breaking to pieces depends upon the absorption of these middle classes by the extremes above and below, then this break-up is no nearer its realization than it was in any earlier period than the nineteenth century.³

In his admirable discussion of "Concentration of Production,"⁴ Professor Ely contends that

the size of the business unit of maximum efficiency must depend upon the capacity of the heads of the business unit, upon the nature of the particular business, and upon the progress which, at the given moment, has been made in the methods of organization. Whenever a business outgrows the capacity of one man to maintain unity, the danger point is reached. Men differ greatly in the generalship required for the management of a vast business, and unity is maintained in some businesses far more easily than in others. It is quite possible that with a division of the railways of the United States into suitable geographical areas, each with a large measure of autonomy, a unified management could in a general way be exercised over them all. The size of the business concern in manufacturing over which unity can be exercised is, so far as can now be seen, much smaller; and still smaller is the mercantile establishment over which unified control can be exercised. Vastly smaller in agriculture is the size of the business unit over which unified control can be exercised. With the change from extensive to inten-

¹ Bullock, *Quart. Jour. Economics*, Vol. XV, pp. 167 ff. For a review of the statistics relating to large-scale production see Simkhovitch, *op. cit.*, pp. 658 ff.

² *Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie*, p. 59.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 65. Cited in Ely, *Monopolies and Trusts*, pp. 190, 191

⁴ *Ibid.*, chap. v.

sive culture there is apparently a general tendency to divide up large estates, although it is perhaps true that after this change has once been made there is again a very moderate movement in the direction of larger farms.¹

In connection with the supposed tendency to "bonanza" farms in the United States the students of economics in the University of Wisconsin have for years pursued investigations, and not one has succeeded in demonstrating any concentration in agricultural production so far as area is concerned, although one student thought that there is a trend toward greater average values.²

The general conclusion therefore seems to be that industrial concentration has many hindering forces, that there is a point of maximum efficiency relative to particular enterprises, and that the universal trend toward consolidation and monopoly, however great it may be as one phase of economic change, has not corresponded with the early logical statement.

Similar observation may be made on the doctrine of increasing misery.³ The original formulation based itself in part on a version of the iron law of wages, according to which the worker is treated as a commodity whose labor-power is bought and sold in the cheapest market by the exploiting capitalist: he is paid enough to keep his physical forces intact and to support a family in order that his children may continue the régime of confiscating surplus value.⁴ Laws and institutions made by capitalistic masters hedge him in more and more, and, in the midst of accumulating social wealth stolen by private interests, his state, by logical antithesis, increases in precariousness and poverty.

It is not now held even by the socialists that such is irretrievably the case. Historians of popular movements note the fact that periods of protest are not times of direst poverty, but times of comparative prosperity, intelligence, and keen comparison of the status of classes.⁵ There is a general recognition that at least no such clean-cut formulation as Marx and George gave to the matter is tenable,⁶ even though one is keenly alive to undoubted maladjustments and inequalities, and to the well-known fact that the burden of our economic system presses most heavily upon those least able

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 194, 195.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 193; cf. Sombart, *Socialism*, p. 159; Thompson, *Constructive Program of Socialism*, pp. 63 ff.; *Capital*, pp. 512 ff.

³ *Manifesto*, p. 13.

⁴ *Capital*, pp. 627 ff.

⁵ Rogers, *Economic Interpretation of History*, p. 81.

⁶ Cf. Jaurès, *Studies in Socialism*, p. 161; Ashley, *Progress of the German Working Classes*, p. 140.

to bear it. A recent investigation of the material prosperity of the working class in the United States, published in Adams and Sumner's *Labor Problems*,¹ comes to this general conclusion:

While the data upon this subject are imperfect and tentative, they establish a strong probability that the proportion of wealth in the hands of the wealthy is astonishingly, if not alarmingly, great; but they also indicate with less certainty that the distribution of wealth is becoming less, rather than more, unequal.²

In the course of the study, the following points are indicative of the complexity of the problem and the futility of dogmatic assertion: (a) It is extremely difficult to estimate at different historical periods the amount of real, as compared with nominal, wages, and the comparative standards of life. (b) It is fairly evident that in the last hundred years wages have increased, hours of work diminished, sanitation improved, and a general distribution been made of articles of dress and household conveniences such as the mediaeval nobility would have envied. (c) But the strain of "speeding up" of the machine has intensified, accidents have multiplied, and mental and nervous diseases show the inability of men racially inured to hunting and outdoor activities to adjust themselves to a "high gear" standardized civilization. (d) It is demonstrated that concentration of wealth may be coincident with a wide distribution of goods to the wage-earning groups.

All in all, the question is not one which lends itself easily to hasty judgment or prediction of certain future tendencies; it demands patient, continued study and judicious application of remedial measures.

The early socialist view of the modern state illustrates a characteristic painting in bold colors which allow insufficient room for delicate light and shade; as usual, the Marxian indictment contains partial truth needing qualification and enlargement. Here again there has been a gradual change of attitude: the early era of hostility and no compromise with the industrial masters has merged into one accompanied by greater willingness to detect, in the midst of undoubted opposition of interest between "capitalistic" politics and "proletarian" aspirations, some positive co-operative aspects in the already organized system.³ This attitude is said to be not only perceptible among the "revisionists," but to be noticeable also among the orthodox Marxians, as shown by recent attention to

¹ Chap. xiii.

² *Ibid.*, p. 535.

³ Kampffmeyer, *Changes in the Theory and Tactics of the Social Democracy* (Chicago, 1908), pp. 24 ff; Jaurès, *op. cit.* p. 33.

the claims of militarism and national patriotism: the *Manifesto* declared the workers to be an international brotherhood and without a country.¹

It is proposed in the following discussion to state the position of Marx in relation to the conditions out of which it emerged and to emphasize, in the light of advancing needs, the limitations of the extreme socialist view generated by German surroundings, as well as the limitations of the extreme individualism characteristic of the "American spirit." Marx considered the political system in which he was born and persecuted² a close corporation, selfishly managed in the interest of semi-feudal landlords and corrupt *bourgeoisie*, and pursuing belligerent, military methods in war and industry. The state was an arbitrary concern exploiting weaker peoples for its economic advantage and employing its norm, its laws, its police, to repress the legitimate demands of the workers.³ All the professions, the "intellectuals," were parasitic growths, drawing sustenance by observing and propagating the "ruling ideas" which emanated from basal economic interests.⁴ Under the pressure of self-preservation, the state sanctioned predatory practices in industry, the rights of private property and anti-social accumulation, and, as in all wars of conquest, was careless of human life, unless its interests were endangered by failure to attend to the urging of humanitarian motives. Against the artificiality of the capitalist political organization, he sets the synthetic state of socialism. War, national patriotism, class virtue, and predatory conquest abroad and at home will be eliminated when the economic conditions calling out anti-social conduct are removed. Private property in the means of production—which are, antithetically, even now social and co-operative in their internal organization—is the substantial basis of the higher life of the *bourgeoisie*; with the destruction of exploitation, the function of priest, lawyer, soldier, and "ideological" philosopher

¹ Cf. Kampffmeyer, *op. cit.*, chap. iii; Veblen, *Quart. Jour. Economics*, Vol. XXI, pp. 319 ff.

² A good narration of his career is found in Rae, *Contemporary Socialism*, chap. iv.

³ *Manifesto*, p. 9.

⁴ The corollary of the original Marx-Engels position is to welcome misery and disasters of the "contradictory" capitalist system, agitate, and wait for its dissolution; suffrage and parliamentary representatives can do little; the theory and tactics have gradually come around to the position that the democratizing and socializing of the present order can be brought about by means of cautious reform activity of the working class through divers means: it is not necessary for capitalistic contradictions to become acute that a spontaneous explosion may occur. This is in part a return to, in part an advance over, Lassalle's view of the creative and transitional function of the state. Cf. Kampffmeyer, *op. cit.*, p. 11; for the oscillations and opposition of opinion and practice in such leaders as Bebel, Liebknecht, Kautsky, and Von Vollmar; see, *op. cit.*, chap. i.

will disappear, since all the professions are in one way or another subservient to an essentially vicious system. The future political organization will be, not a state, but a civil society,¹ an industrial copartnership, managing and distributing economic resources, and, presumably, fostering the requisite psychological and moral attitudes which thoroughgoing co-operation will engender. The military and predatory controlling machinery of the *bourgeoisie* will vanish; expropriators will be expropriated, and all who are now divided into "proletariat" and "*bourgeoisie*" will be forced to a standard of labor, of service rendered to society.

To secure perspective for his view one should call to mind the influence upon Marx of the French radicals,² the transforming of Hegelian idealism into the "humanism" of Feuerbach, and the reaction of his impetuous Hebrew nature against the Prussian administrative system. The "set" given by the Hohenzollerns toward benevolent despotism, restriction of free thought, and political participation, was distasteful to him, and the halting reforms initiated by Stein would not satisfy those who had felt the European revolutionary impetus. Moreover, there was the dawning economic revolution in Germany attended by a vast increase of wealth, which Marx considered drained from peasant and factory laborer, concentrated in an idle aristocracy and in harsh official hands, and used to support the hierarchy and the standing army.

Hegel, to some extent, served to give philosophical idealization to this situation. He praised the prince³ and the constitutional monarchy, treated war as an ethical necessity⁴ (the stage of antithesis), explained the rationality of the stratification of classes,⁵ and discountenanced public opinion as a vague chaotic imitation of the unification of reason in the reflective and ruling members of the state.⁶ The value of his emphasis upon finding one's freedom in the organic state and the sanity of his judgment and historical insight are not the points in question: he was a son of his own time, as he admitted.

These characteristics of the political system—its military basis, its boast to do good for the people, its grudging vouchsafing of "rights," its Platonic class division, its surveillance of press and university, its indisposition to recognize the contributions of all members of the community—drove Marx to the extreme of not expecting any good from the semi-feudal capitalistic structure of his time. And the flavor of charity in the upper

¹ Rae, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

² Cf. Wundt, *Ethik*, Vol. I, pp. 507 ff.

³ *Philosophy of Right*, p. 283.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 332.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 275.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 322.

circles, of *granting* favors, of *conferring* old-age pensions and industrial insurance, is the reason why the strict socialists will not admit that the public ownership of railways and assumed devotion to the poor is genuine socialization. The state socialism of Bismarck¹ proceeds, in their opinion, on the assumption that reform can only come from the top, from the professional thinker and administrators, whereas the socialist idea is that the new society must build from the bottom—must be an achievement won by immanent forces working out in the “proletariat.”²

In the insistence that the state after all must be an organized expression of general co-operation the Marxian socialists are undoubtedly right, but in refusing to admit the positive and sympathetic motives existing in the present state, they are undoubtedly declining to see “facts” which belie their theory. The present state is both quasi-military and co-operative. It is true that an emergency, such as a revision of the tariff, calls out the industrial warriors, each calling for “protection” irrespective of the common good, and it is true that there is “exploitation” in public, as well as in private, business. But there are also social impulses working in both; and the problem really vital is to find ways and means to facilitate such sympathetic activity. The fallacy of the socialist is to suppose that the social attitude is present in the bottom sections only of the social pyramid; that of the élite is to assume that no contribution can come from the irresponsible “people.”

A further consideration to be noted is that even if we grant the predatory basis of capitalistic political organization, one means of changing its character to that of co-operation is by continually increasing its sphere and eliciting responsibility and the social attitude, even at the cost of some preliminary failure.³ The situation in America illustrates this side of the problem. Instead of starting out on the continental theory that government should work *for* the non-effective people, America, reacting against England, took the stand that government was in its essence a necessary evil

¹ Cf. Dawson, *Bismarck and State Socialism*, chap. iii.

² The *Manifesto* claimed that the proletariat was the only revolutionary class; recent socialist opinion denies this (Thompson, *Constructive Program of Socialism*, p. 9).

³ “To be afraid to extend the functions of government may be to lose what we have. A government has always received feeble support from its constituents as soon as its demands appeared childish or remote. Citizens inevitably neglect or abandon civic duty, when their government no longer embodies their genuine desires.”—Jane Addams, *Newer Ideals of Peace*, pp. 112, 113. Professor Ely insists upon the truth that additional responsibility calls out devotion to the common good and greater efficiency. This he forcibly applies to the problem of municipal ownership of public utilities.

and should be restricted to narrow "police functions."¹ Our extensions of constitutional powers have always been excused on the score that each extension was "implied" in the original demarkation. It is a well-known fact that today any assumption of new responsibilities is decried because it transgresses "freedom." Such freedom is found on examination to mean freedom *from* such oppressive government as George III typifies, and which colored the views of our political builders. The individualistic critics of this persuasion forget that practically we have long outgrown the early conception, and notwithstanding the anti-social element still present in our political system, the beneficent activities centering in our national and state capitols and city halls bear witness to the fact that government is also social, educational, and ethical. The problem of the enlargement of governmental activities is not correctly stated, therefore, if we ask: Shall we put additional duties upon a state, which is to perform benevolent services for the people whether they co-operate or not (as in Germany)? Neither should we ask: Shall we give up our "liberties" and add to legitimate police functions of government the control of health or industry, for example (the conventional American way)? Both statements of the question ignore the vital fact that the positive co-operative state is here, because social impulses are already operating in so far as people live a community life, and that the real problem, again, is to find more fruitful outlet for capacities now existing: this *may* mean a giving-up of honored state activities. The individualist, who objects to social control because he imagines he is sacrificing freedom, attains a further lessening of real freedom because he has thrown away the necessary mechanism and laws through which freedom is attained. Conversely, the socialist who shuns the corrupt capitalistic state is throwing away the only obvious means of attaining a possible co-operative commonwealth, and has to console himself by recourse to a predetermined economic evolution. Says Jane Addams:

While the state spends millions of dollars and employs thousands of servants to nurture and heal the sick and defective, it steadfastly refuses to extend its kindness to the normal working man. The socialists alone constantly appeal for this extension. They refuse, however, to deal with the *present State*, and constantly take refuge in the formulae of a *new Scholasticism*. Their orators are busily engaged in establishing two substitutes for human nature which they call "proletarian" and "capitalist." They ignore the fact that varying, imperfect human nature is incalculable, and that to eliminate its varied and constantly

¹ Cf. a fine characterization of the weakness of the individualistic notion, and the possibilities of an investigatory, deliberative, and constructive governmental organization when society becomes conscious of itself, in Ward, *Psychic Factors in Civilization*, pp. 319 ff.

changing elements is to face all the mistakes and miscalculations which gather around the "fallen man" or the "economic man" or any other of the fixed norms which have from time to time been substituted for expanding and developing human life. In time "the proletarian" and "the capitalist" will become the impedimenta which it will be necessary to clear away in order to make room for the mass of living and breathing citizens with whom self-government must eventually deal.¹

The history of factory legislation, public control of natural monopolies, public care of dependent and defective, public education, old-age pensions, and the thousand remedial devices proceeding in part at least from active popular demand does not substantiate either the early plea of Spencerian individualism, or the socialistic opposition to the "patchwork" concessions of a predatory *bourgeois* state. Certainly the state has not yet come to consciousness of its positive function, yet there is no need of minimizing the ultimate validity of present extensions of its activity and of assuming either that they transgress original natural rights and eternal limits of the political sphere, or that they are merely anticipatory regulations preparing for a New Jerusalem whose structure and functions are now known in detail. Either position is a patent example of the extreme empirical and rationalistic fallacy of trying to derive the meaning of immediate conditions outside the process of solving the present problem, of resting upon chosen "facts" or given "ideas."

The reaction of evolving experience upon old concepts illustrated above by the complexities of industrial concentration, distribution of economic and social goods to the masses, and functions of government serves to show the emptiness of logical formulation in advance of the changing conditions, and enforces once more the prime necessity of a persistent restatement of the problem.

¹ *Newer Ideals of Peace*, p. 86. (Italics mine.)

V. TRANSITION FROM THE HEGELIAN-MARXIAN THEORY TO RECENT OPPORTUNISM

It will make for definiteness to give a schematic summary of the general transition from the early logical method to the later, together with further evidences of the reconstruction of doctrine by the "revisionists."

1. The Hegelian system was formulated under the influence of romanticism, continental liking for systematization, an immature science, and dawning interest in social evolution. Hegel advocated an immanent, Absolute Teleology; his advance was a firm grasp of the process of friction, of antithesis, of unfolding of meaning implicit in the elements constituting a problem; his defect, a failure to connect the dialectic of reason with a workable application of hardly won truth to immediate, practical ends, and a consequent idealization of already attained valuations. To offset his logic of the Idea and his minimizing of the democratizing value of new facts and scientific invention, the Left reduced the march of history to material fact and economic evolution determined by invention, i. e., the "tools," the technique of production. It retained, however, the logical inevitableness and consistency characteristic of the rationalistic animus, and, to match the exaggerated claims of the possessors of reason, the "professional" estates, magnified the counterclaims of the dependent occupational classes, the "proletariat." The Marxian theory is at once fatalistic and revolutionary; it assumes an unchanging validity in its categories—the materialistic interpretation of history, the class struggle, surplus value, inevitable exploitation, and ultimate victory of the proletariat. Whatever present contradictions appear are explained away after the rationalistic manner: they are "appearances," "illusions," in no wise affecting the real trend.

2. The next stage in the development of method shows the influence of exact scientific research and an appreciation of its tentative procedure.¹ The students of primitive life do not obtain indubitable evidence of any inevitable and predetermined drift. Although it may be said that Hegel stated in abstract phraseology the general process of the origin of species,

¹ No caution is needed that a sharp line cannot be drawn. The Marxian of today is the "revisionist" of tomorrow: and conservative revisionist becomes an "impossibilist" the day after. Leaders, e. g., Liebknecht, are combinations of not altogether compatible attitudes, like all statesmen forced to compromise.

yet his Absolute Teleology is not reconcilable with a cumulative impact of environment, a mechanical sequence of cause and effect and a more or less blind selective agency of nature.¹ In so far as this mode of thought is invoked to explain social growth a confession of inability to state the matter in strict logical and teleological terms follows. Geographical and climatic peculiarities, racial endowment, heredity, occupation, "psychical tradition," and a hundred other factors must be taken into account; there can be no rigid determination by inevitable economic forces in a foreseen direction simply because the economic is an abstraction from a complex of mutually conditioning forces in a particular social group. By no straining can the Marxian doctrine be made to harmonize; it is true that the socialists welcome biological and anthropological literature because it appears on the surface to confirm their doctrines, but in so far as the logic of the scientific method is grasped they modify their original assumptions.² The attempt of Kautsky (a strict Marxian), for example, to find support for the doctrine of periodic revolution from De Vries' mutation hypothesis is more ingenious than convincing.³ It is evident that the utilitarian and empirical element of the Marxian system is most adapted to welcome the mechanical view of the scientists, but in so far as the amalgamation takes place, the logical, teleological, and inevitable drawn from Hegelian sources is dropped, and the initial concepts so attenuated as to be hardly recognizable. The cleavage within the socialist ranks between orthodox Marxian or "impossibilist," and "opportunistic" or revisionist, is due to the influence of scientific investigation, in conjunction with the vast difference in the conditions with which the socialists must cope when they start to work out their problems in the various countries of the world.⁴

3. The third step in the conception of method owes its origin to more recent contributions of biology and psychology. Even in early forms of life there is an "accommodation" and active "attitude" which selects just what response to make to stimuli; and in psychology, the frequency of the words "function," "attention," and "concrete end" is indicative of the dynamic and reconstructive nature of consciousness. How this

¹ Cf. Ritchie, *Darwin and Hegel*, p. 56.

² Cf. Dietzgen, *Philosophical Essays*, pp. 314 ff.

³ Kautsky, *The Social Revolution*, p. 16.

⁴ On the revisionists see Bernstein, *Voraussetzungen des Socialismus* and *Zur Geschichte und Theorie des Socialismus*; Jaurès, *op. cit.*, chap. xiii; Kampffmeyer, *op. cit.*, *passim*; Brooks, *The Social Unrest*, pp. 309 ff.; Ensor, *Modern Socialism*, esp. Introduction; Hobson, *The Social Problem*; Spargo, *Socialism*; Sombart, *Socialism and the Social Movement*, esp. chap. iv; Ashley, *Progress of the German Working Classes*, pp. 139 ff.; Hobhouse, *Democracy and Reaction*, pp. 217 ff.

view affects the theory of logical method has been suggested in the introductory section. It may pertinently be reasserted that, in contrast with the former views, the instrumentalist attitude does not admit either a fixed teleology or a fixed mechanical sequence, a fixed unchanging purpose or equally unchanging facts. In any definite problem the facts are necessary means to the end and called for by the problem. The instrumentalist is satisfied with a method which can preserve a teleology implicit in daily experience, a method of immediate control and constant attainment of purpose. One may say, therefore, that he possesses a working theory which is not liable to the weakness of Hegelian-Marxian Absolutism—that of dissipating attention from the next thing to be done. Neither is it liable to the infirmity of an exclusive devotion to chosen facts. Admission must instantly be made, however, that some revisionists are fully alive to the implications of the experimental method; and no statement of the evolution of the theory and practice of social reform would be adequate without considering some of the many modifications achieved by them. The following are representative:¹

1. They rebuke a worship of Marx, Engels, or any socialist document, claiming that the best disciple is the expander of the doctrine.

2. They evince an enthusiasm and belief in the permanent value of reforms less ambitious than a complete overhauling of the whole social edifice. The questions of milk supply, tuberculosis, municipal ownership, the referendum, public parks, industrial education, and a score of others are treated on their merits; significant, too, is the favorable attitude to co-operative experiments and trade unions. Certainly the socialist platforms have always contained “immediate demands;” the basal change is an assertion of the real worth in themselves of the remedial measures, not simply as a preparation for a future régime. In fact, there is considerable hesitancy to venture any predictions of what society is to be, or to set up definite criteria of distributive justice.

3. They do not propose to convert *all* the means of production and distribution into common ownership. Those sufficiently developed and concentrated to be used in common, those which are monopolistic, and found by experience to be dangerous if privately owned, are the chosen candidates for public ownership. They do not wish to destroy private industry or initiative. What they insist upon is not centralization as an end *per se* but economical management and just distribution. Voluntary local enterprises are advocated.

¹ Cf. Thompson, *Constructive Program*, chap. i; Jaurès, *op. cit.*, chap. xiii; Kampffmeyer, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

4. Not revolution, but evolution, is the recent cry. The belligerency of the class-struggle doctrine is materially softened, and there is a recognition of the fact that socialism is not limited to wage-earners. The "intellectuals" are not looked upon with suspicion.

5. They admit that each nation has its appropriate type of socialist movement. In democratic countries with legislative bodies and proportional representation, socialism must adopt theories and programmes radically different from those fitted to monarchical and partly feudal societies.

6. While protesting against an uncritical eulogy of "love" as a solvent of social ills, they transcend the cynical Marxian version of innate depravity by insisting upon the essential goodness of human instincts and the possibility of making adverse economic conditions a stimulus to moral activity *now*.¹

The list could be extended indefinitely; it is enough to indicate that a folk movement constituting the storm center of popular aspiration has passed through its utopian and dogmatic childhood to constructive maturity: it is dynamic and progressive.

It has already been intimated that a consideration of the socialist standpoint in its numerous mutations is important because it presents in sharply drawn outline the direction toward which social movement seems to be hurrying, from the standpoint of those who hitherto have not been heard distinctly.² From any angle it is extremely suggestive that a groping popular protest should take its rise from the structure of a philosophical system summing up a long period of idealistic reflection, and that it should attempt to incorporate the findings of modern evolutionary science into its rationalistic framework. That the Fourth Estate should arrive at a world-view is a conquest, irrespective of the tenability of its doctrines; and that daily work should be regarded as the going-out point of political, ethical, and religious values is prophetic of the time when society shall become so conscious of human values that it can patiently survey all its "facts," however uncomfortable, and formulate its constructive measures without the omission of one factor essential to the solution of its problem. Just as Hegel presented a world-view from the standpoint of the "idea"

¹ In this there is a return to the point of view of the Utopians as well as to that stream of socialistic tendency initiated by Maurice and Kingsley and continued with modifications, by Ruskin, Morris, and others whose interest is ethical and artistic. It should be noted that, in this discussion, the stress is laid on the really basal socialism, Marxism, and its deflections.

² Ritchie and Brooks assert that the logical goal of Trade Unionism is socialism. Observers hostile to socialism admit that the logic underlying lesser devices of social amelioration has some likeness to the various species of socialistic thought.

and the reflective and protected "profession," and as Marx gave his message of the "fact" and the proletarian "occupation," so may a self-conscious society be willing to use both contributions as means to the enlargement and deepening of the common life which progressively comprehends and synthesizes all interests however apparently irreconcilable. The Hegelian-Marxian teleology stripped of its metaphysical bias, emphasizes the necessity of hypotheses, predicates, constructive plans, which shall be comprehensive and universal, and the Utilitarian counting of sensational "points" asserts the futility of leaving out any vital fact.

Modern sociology has arisen from an awareness of this double need, and the part which the socialist philosophy has played as a stimulus to its development has often been discussed.¹ Sociology attempts to supply a philosophical background, a generalized view of the social process, and at the same time to construct a "social technology" which utilizes all the evidence drawn from whatever source. It combines devotion to the "fact" with attention to constructive purposes. It is necessary at this juncture to show how the attempted solution of any social problem involves the elements of the socialist philosophy, and to show, from the sociological point of view, what diverse interpretations and reconstructions may be made of so-called immutable "facts" and unchanging "ideas."

¹ Small and Vincent, *Introduction to the Study of Society*, chap. ii.

VI. LOGICAL METHOD AS EMPLOYED IN RECENT SOLUTIONS OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS

The object of this section is to treat three examples of the employment of the constructive method of social reformation: (1) the trade agreement; (2) the consumers' label, and (3) the social settlement. In the case of each we shall consider the elements of the "objective situation," whether practical or theoretical, which set the problem, and the results secured by its technique of securing equilibrium.

1. The conditions producing the trade-union movement are familiar. In general, these conditions go back to one cause, the existence of the wage system made necessary by the age of machinery. The effects of the wage system with its minute division of the industrial processes are as follows: (a) a precariousness of "tenure of office" on the part of both employer and employee due to competition and shifting of demand; (b) a consequent subjection, especially of the workingman, to impersonal economic forces; (c) an inequality in relative power of enforcing claims arising from wages or conditions of work; (d) a necessary division of status. In general, the workingman feels that he is destined to belong to his "class" during his whole life;¹ (e) a difference of psychological attitude between master and man, that of the former being individualistic, that of the latter, collectivistic; (f) a disposition on the part of the worker to demand a progressive raising of his standard of living.

It is the peculiarity of modern economic processes that they underly and condition all our realizable values. One can state this without assenting to the Marxian doctrine, which was founded under peculiar historical exigencies, and constructed without regard to a social psychology admitting the reaction of the *socius* upon presented copies. Nevertheless, the sociologist recognizes that so immediate and vital are the economic interactions that a control of their workings for the purpose of safeguarding the welfare of the community and the imperatives of morality and justice, is an essential and difficult achievement. The logic underlying our adjustment of the social income is, of course, the utilitarian and hedonistic. In its inception it represented the explanation and animus of the rising English capitalist entrepreneur, and his hostility to the "professional" aristocracy and to a control of industry by the state. Its insistence upon private property and

¹ Mitchell, *Organized Labor*, Preface, p. ix.

“rights”—once democratic—has now become the support, defended on legal and moral grounds, of those who manage the economic disposition of things; and its transplanted ideals of privilege have taken on in the eyes of the workingman, the color of a static “professionalism.”¹

Over against the commander of industry has appeared the vast group of those whom the machine industry has driven at once to dependence and to mutual union, in order to equalize the conflict. The concepts of the labor union—collective bargaining and the standard of life—reveal an antithesis to the norms of the employers. Although the unionist proclamation of purpose may be couched in the phraseology of the traditional self-interest, it in fact assumes a different variety of psychology and economics. Instead of starting with particular units whether in the shape of increments of pleasure or economic men, the unionist considers first the total life, interests, economic and social, of his group in relation to the life-interest of competing groups. The competing group may be that of the employer or of other workmen. He tries to consider himself as a factor within an organic changing society. The wages which he receives cannot be looked upon as a mathematically exact reward for individual services. There are no individual services in modern society. His wages become, therefore, a recognition of the value to society of the work which must be done collectively. His work is imbedded in a complex social process, and to make society recognize the ethical and social nature of co-operative endeavor is as much the function of the trade union as to formulate mathematical schedules of prices.² There is bargaining, but it is collective, and conditioned by the standard of life. The problem of the union leader is to insist upon the co-operative group ideal in order to offset the dominantly hedonistic-individualistic, and economic standpoint of the employer. At times the leader calls a strike, reverting to military and clan tactics, but more and more if conflict is entered upon and justified, it is under the shelter of the Hegelian doctrine of no unity without negation. Developments in the last decade warrant the conclusion that the first phase of the theoretical

¹ Veblen, *Theory of Business Enterprise*.

² The term “collective bargaining” usually refers simply to the fact that the schedule of wages applies impartially to each man in a group. There is another use which has been ignored by writers who denounce restriction of output and the unionist opposition to piecework. The term may apply also to a regard for the interests of the working class as a class within a state. Too much work cannot be done by the exceptional man because it injures the health of the others who must keep up with the pacemaker. Future generations of workers would suffer, and disease increase. From this point of view the trade union is performing a work which the state will probably take over in the future. Cf. Höffding, *Ethik*, pp. 283 ff.

and practical reaction on the part of the wage-earners against a military industrialism—that of self-regarding impulse and violence—is merging into the era of discussion, compromise, and definite organization of the means of securing agreement. Professor Commons describes the elaborate system of representation and conference now in successful operation between longshoremen and dock managers, and between mine operators and laborers. He comments as follows:

Philanthropists have long been dreaming of the time when capital and labor should lay aside the strike and boycott and should resort to arbitration. By arbitration they understand the submission of differences to a disinterested third party. But the philanthropists have overlooked a point. Arbitration is never accepted until each party to a dispute is equally afraid of the other: and when they have reached that point, they can adopt something better than arbitration, namely, negotiation. This distinction was clearly brought out at the notable conference on arbitration held at Chicago, in December, 1900, under the auspices of the National Civic Federation. All the speakers were men of practical experience, and they agreed that arbitration is impossible without organization, and that two equally powerful organizations can negotiate as well as arbitrate. This higher form of industrial peace—negotiation—has now reached a formal stage in a half-dozen large industries in the United States, which, owing to its remarkable likeness to parliamentary government in the country of its origin, England, may well be called constitutional government in industry.¹ . . .

The most comforting feature of these negotiations is the matter-of-fact way in which each side takes the other. There is none of that old-time hypocrisy on the part of the employers that their great interest in life is to shower blessings upon their hands: and there is none of that ranting demagoguery on the part of the workmen about the dignity of labor and the iniquity of capital.² . . .

The most important result of these trade agreements is the new feeling of equality and mutual respect which springs up in both employer and employee. After all has been said in press and pulpit, about the "dignity of labor," the only "dignity" that really commands respect is the bald necessity of dealing with labor on equal terms. With scarcely an exception the capitalist officials who make these agreements with the labor officials of these powerful unions testify to their shrewdness, their firmness, their integrity, and their faithfulness to contract. Magnificent generalship is shown in combining under one leadership the miscellaneous races, religions, and politics that compose the miners or the dock laborers of America. The labor movement of no other country has faced such a problem.³

This example of mediating a conflict by means of periodic agreement, necessarily somewhat mechanical, presents encouraging features. There

¹ *Trade Unionism and Labor Problems*, p. 1.

² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

is freedom from adamant compulsion of one party over the other. The norms of employer and employee meet and are adjusted on the high plane of intelligence and workability.¹

2. The circumstances demanding a "label" on goods to be consumed, i. e., a sign of a prescribed "standard" observed in the history of their production, are, like those creating the trade agreement, due to the complexities and maladjustments of our mechanical industries. Specifically, the deplorable situation symbolized by the "sweatshop," allied with the lack of thought and responsibility on the part of the consumers which ends in devotion to fashion, bargain sales, and cheapness without regard to the welfare of the original producer and sales clerk, are more immediate causes.

On the theoretical side, both the classical and the socialist formulation of the reaction of individual upon industry are now defective, because the milieu in which they arose has disappeared. The rising power of the "proletariat" sharply set off from despotic *bourgeois* leaders, seemed to Marx and his followers a cosmic force stimulated by an economic substratum. The employer was moved by no sympathetic motives, and the workers were promised "a world to gain." Production went on automatically: the consumer accepted according to iron laws, and protest and reaction were epiphenomena in no wise affecting permanently the inevitable outcome. It has also become fairly clear that the statement of the classical political economy, even when modified by the Austrian theory of marginal utility, is better able to explain a hypothetical régime of economic harmony than one of reconstruction. Its logic is of the fact. Professor Clark contends that in a competitive "state of nature" perfect adjustment and satisfaction are inevitable. But the difficulty is that ours is a dynamic society in which economic desires are continually being modified and conditioned by growing intellectual and spiritual demands. The lack of racial and historical perspective, the inability to explain an expanding valuation typified by the complex of interests known as the standard of life, on the basis of quantitative calculation of "wants" of the pleasurable kind, are unsatisfactory qualifications when a definite criterion of choice and the possibility of progress are the questions asked. For reasons advanced in various connections, neither the logic underlying the socialist economics nor the classical hedonism offers an adequate account of how individual and group valuations can modify the so-called impersonal mechanism of our industrial system: neither takes into consideration sufficiently the fact that our desires, our interests, are progressive and social in their inmost nature.

¹ Small, *General Sociology*, pp. 357 ff.

The label is a device which, at least partially, secures an organic contact between manufacturer, worker, and consumer, each of whom, in our modern complicated economic technique, is more or less separated from the others. The trade-union label and the consumers'-league label indicate that after more or less investigation the goods in question are pronounced worthy of choice, not simply on the ground of "pleasure," but because they are made under sanitary and humane conditions of work, under compliance with law, and for fair wages.¹ The label is a method of dealing with an objective situation by considering the sweat shop as a problem to be solved by the long-circuit way of intelligence and balancing of essential factors, instead of the short-circuit plan of denouncing the depravity of those immediately involved; it shows that a degree of control may be secured by adequate comprehension of the sum of conditions operating to produce goods needed by society. More specifically, in so far as the label has been successful, it has had the following effects:

a) It has allowed the employer scope to express his humane interest in his employees. He has been willing to make his factory a decent place in which to work and to give his employees a wage sufficient to maintain a good life. If the conditions imposed seem to disregard his "freedom" and prerogatives, it has elevated the level of competition by guaranteeing a body of customers who will check the impulse to buy in the cheapest market when cheapness conflicts with the common wealth; thus sanity and an enlightened self-interest may agree.

b) For the worker the benefits are obvious. The label, as employed by the trade unionist, is a peaceful and effective instrument for attaining his ideals, a method far superior to the boycott and strike which necessarily involve misunderstanding, friction, and waste.

c) The consumer has, to a degree, remade the so-called impersonal economic machinery: he has paid a price which will insure cleanliness, the carrying-on of the life-process for both manufacturer and worker, and has checked the universality of mere cheapness and the assumed right of the employer to run his business unmolested by the society which largely presents him with his tools and education. The struggle has been shifted to a higher plane.

3. Most impressive, perhaps, of all instruments for understanding and interpreting social movement is the modern social settlement. Its general characteristic is well known—a group of people identifying themselves intellectually and sympathetically with a community, and striving to work,

¹ Kelley, *Ethical Gains through Legislation*, chap. vi; Mitchell, *Organized Labor*, chap. xxxiii.

not for, but with, the inhabitants, for the purpose of furthering the beneficent forces implicit in social contact.¹ A satisfactory account of all the ramifications of its mediatory function would carry us far afield; only a few features germane to phases of the social question previously touched upon can be considered.

a) With reference to the stratification of society into the conservative, the favored by birth and training, and the unenlightened "masses," the social settlement has made a distinct contribution. It recognizes that, in so far as the holders of the ancient "idea" seclude themselves from the sweep of evolving needs, and fail to amalgamate their ideals and practices in correspondence thereto, the Marxian indictment has weight.² But the settlement feels that the more universal element existing in professional service—the element which carries one beyond "economic determinism," traditional obedience to family, and "class" virtue—needs but a chance to manifest itself. It is significant that in England and in America, the settlement has struck root deepest where the "educated," the college man and woman, feel most keenly the need for democratizing their acquisitions; it has aimed to be a point of contact with humanitarian impulses needing concrete unimpeded expression; ministers, lawyers, and teachers have always been conspicuous in its activities. There is in modern society an over-intellectualization of the few³ and an under-liberalization of the many, notwithstanding the greatness of our "common" schools.

There is at present a general disturbance of consciousness and failure of ideals among ourselves, indicated by the failure of many, indeed of most, to command the leisure and access of copies which would develop their characteristic powers.⁴

The few suffer from overspecialization, an accumulation of "ideas" without active outlet, at the same time that the practical occupations of the many are unilluminated by the glow of meaning.⁵ More serious than this is the chasm which accumulation of wealth by individualistic and anti-

¹ Mead, *University of Chicago Record*, Vol. XV, pp. 108 ff.

² James, *Talks to Teachers*, p. 297; Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, Vol. II, pp. 282, 283.

³ Höffding, *Ethik*, pp. 317 ff.

⁴ Thomas, *Am. Jour. Sociology*, May, 1908, p. 736. Lester Ward enforces the judgment that in capacity for development there are no marked differences answering to present social grouping. (*Pure Sociology*, pp. 447 ff., and pp. 662 ff., and *Applied Sociology*, *passim*.)

⁵ Jane Addams, *Philanthropy and Social Progress*, chap. i; Hobson, *The Social Problem*, chap. xiv.

social methods has produced between conspicuous, irresponsible leisure and deadening daily toil. It is the conviction of the settlement that the professions should be "socialized" and the occupations "professionalized."

b) Consequently the settlement has been insistent upon that sort of education which serves to connect the intellectual inheritance of the past with the needs of the present, so that what Ruskin and Morris and Marx preached in various ways—the fundamental significance of labor—may be realized. Believing that the values of life proceed from the necessities of daily activity, it seeks to take as its point of departure the occupational skill of the artisan, the dexterities of the immigrant, in order that imagination, interest, and meaning may transform barren work into educative activity.

We apparently believe that the workingman has no chance to realize life through his vocation. We easily recognize the historic association in regard to ancient buildings. We say that "generation after generation have stamped their mark upon them, have recorded their thoughts in them until they have become the property of all." And yet this is even more true of the instruments of labor, which have constantly been held in human hands. A machine really represents the "seasoned life of man" preserved and treasured up within itself, quite as much as an ancient building does. At present, workmen are brought in contact with the machinery with which they work as abruptly as if the present set of industrial implements had been newly created. They handle the machinery day by day without any notion of its gradual evolution and growth. Few of the men who perform the mechanical work in the great factories have any comprehension of the fact that the inventions upon which the factory depends, the instruments which they use, have been slowly worked out, each generation using the gifts of the last and transmitting the inheritance until it has become a social possession. This can only be understood by a man who has obtained some idea of social progress. We are still childishly pleased when we see the further subdivision of labor going on, because the quantity of the output is increased thereby, and we apparently are unable to take our attention away from the product long enough to really focus it upon the producer. Theoretically, "the division of labor" makes men more interdependent and human by drawing them into a unity of purpose. "If a number of people decide to build a road, and one digs and one brings stones and another breaks them, they are quite inevitably united by their interest in the road. But this naturally presupposes that they know where the road is going to, that they have some curiosity and interest about it, and perhaps a chance to travel upon it."¹

c) The social settlement has probably served to interpret democracy more than has any other institution. The common conception is that America

¹ Addams, *Democracy and Social Ethics*, pp. 209-11. Cf. Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. II, p. 538.

has a closely woven pattern of government and that all the energy needed is to induce immigrants to come to our shores, accept the constitution, and adopt our ideals ready made. Miss Addams shows the futility of this rendering, and describes the readjustments in theory and practice which the needs of municipalities, especially the presence of foreign peoples in our cities, force upon our traditional interpretation. According to her argument, the blight of militarism and group prejudice has unsettled social practice and judgment even to the degree of condoning child labor because of the assumed necessity to protect business interests and an attendant necessity of a fixed status for "working people;" and, in its exclusiveness, America fails to incorporate the gifts of the immigrant—his skill, his art, his loyalty. But by means of a kindly back-working, because of the hard necessities of intergroup give-and-take, of unemployment and simple charity, Miss Addams thinks, there is developing a cosmopolitanism, a socializing of impulse, which will more and more transmute the old military virtues of daring, self-sacrifice, and emulation into positive social virtues expressing themselves in the pride of workmanship and struggle against evil. The war for land and "preservation of honor" will be succeeded by the war for sanitary tenements, sane politics, and abolition of disease. The democracy based upon a revolt from despotism and eighteenth-century concepts will be reinterpreted and beautified by the reaction of new facts upon old ideals. The state will lose its negative and military character, and become positive and co-operative because embodying the genuine desires and not the fears of the citizens constituting it.

d) By reason of intimate knowledge of civic relationships, because of sympathy with its neighborhood, the social settlement is admirably fitted to allow conflicting impulses and interests to secure equilibrium in times of crisis. The efficiency of its technique revealed itself on the occasion of a supposed attempt to assassinate the chief of police of one of our large American cities. The newspapers, backed by the sentiment of the constituency whom they served, blazoned forth the "facts." A Russian Jew—an "anarchist"—gained entrance to the house of the chief with brutal intent. The officer in self-defense shot the malefactor. The community was urged to arise and stamp out lawlessness and anarchism. The police should prohibit all meetings and repress and arrest; there were the plain "facts" and there was the written "law." The police, backed by the newspapers, announced that there would be no investigation: it was a clear case. The socialists insisted that it was the old trick of the authorities to uphold "capitalism" and property. The Russian Jewish population was thrown into consternation and bitterness because of the Russian

methods of the police and the stigma which race hatred attached to a whole group because of the offense of one of its members.

It is not necessary to follow out the story; the pertinent point is that the social settlement was the only sane instrument in the whole city to find out the meaning of the crisis and reveal it to the immigrant and the whole community. In the process of effecting its purpose it was compelled to incur the criticism of press, socialist, Jewish population, and the public in general, and its degree of success or failure was measured by the ease with which it could control the conditions.¹ But, instead of violent impulse and brutal force, it attempted to employ the constructive reaction of investigation and intelligence.

The distinguishing trait, therefore, of the social settlement is that it is a mediatory device, that it has no predetermined formulas to work by, that it is a creator of values. It does not represent simply the interests of the conservative, the business men, and the cultured; neither does it defend without regard to social stability, the demands of "the poor lower classes." Because, ideally, it represents no vested interests, no exclusively "*bourgeois*" or "*proletarian*" virtues, it occupies a strategic point in interpreting new experience in the light of old, and old valuations in the light of the changing. Its resident "workers" are in a peculiar measure implicated in the reorganization which they effect in the community; there is nothing of the aloofness of lawgiver and administrator; its aim is that of applying intelligence to the control of social interaction. Its achievements reveal the flexibility and constructiveness of the instrumental method, the nature of which in relation to social problems it has been the endeavor of this thesis to state.

¹ Jane Addams, *Charities and the Commons*, May, 2, 1908, pp. 105 ff.

VII. LOGICAL METHOD AND DEMOCRACY

A review of the general tenor of the discussion may appropriately be put in terms of a conception of democracy. During the past century the static, romantic, and individualistic view of democracy inherited from radical English and French thinkers has been reconstructed to square with the rich development of historical and evolutionary science. It has been seen that controlled change is the only criterion of stability, that life is an endless process of becoming in which structure and function, the group and the individual, habit and attention, are necessary interacting and mutually conditioning elements. Whether society is conceived as an "organism" or as an "organization," it remains certain that no association can be entirely rational and worthy in which the contributions of all its constituents are not recognized as factors in the solution of its problem. That the past generation has seen the rise of a social psychology drawing its material from the evolution of the animal series, of the child, and of the race, coincidently with a wholesome enthusiasm for a constructive sociology, is not of merely speculative interest: it is one manifestation of the dawn of intense awareness of the meaning of social evolution. It is democracy come to know itself. There can persist no dogma, no institution, no privileged group exempted from the searchlight of sane investigation and possibility of transformation. A periodic taking of stock, an intellectual pessimism, a disbelief in the absolute and enduring office of the established custom and authority, is the only guarantee of social order which the theory of a constructive democracy can tolerate. No panacea can obviate the need of specific treatment, and all the apparently remote and academic discoveries of specialized science and theoretical speculation find their excuse for being in a turning-back and application to that social medium in which they arise. A society which has become self-conscious cannot leave out of account anything which the honest conviction of its members has contributed, for it is the constant assertion of the worth of unique experience which secures that co-ordination through progressive reconstruction, which distinguishes a dynamic civilization.

Again from this angle follows the contention that a problem of whatever kind cannot be solved unless within the point of crisis there be allowed the free play of investigation, reconstruction, and control. A conclusion of this kind will satisfy neither the extremist nor a society whose keepers of


order have as yet not realized the implications of a tolerant, positive view of democracy. The state has recognized the duty of educating the young, secluding the unsocial, and caring for the weak and unfortunate. But it has not embodied in its working theory and technique the measure of truth and justice which exists in the world-views proffered by the many varieties of radicalism. The present analysis of the assumptions of typical social protests does not warrant the conclusion that society is rushing toward any predetermined goal; it does confirm the opinion of many writers that the state is losing a notable opportunity if it fails to adjust itself to undercurrents which have become international. The fervor and practical energy which is now concentrated and driven against social stability could become a mighty upbuilding force if directed by a state willing to give more intelligent heed to the elements of truth which exist in the midst of the vagaries of radicalism.

Certainly it is not true that the state has been entirely blind to the demands of popular protest; the remarkable contemporaneous record of improvement in Australia, Germany, Belgium, England, and the United States testifies to a transformation of the theory and practice of democracy which the future historian will see in clearer perspective than is possible for us. It may reasonably be hoped that the widespread interest in the as yet inchoate study of sociology and its application in social technology may be symbolic of the conviction that if human experience is to grow richer and more meaningful, it must be by virtue of purposive thinking applied to the uses of living.

The distinctive features of the constructive method of experimental logic are consonant with the evolutionary view of democracy to which the Anglo-Saxon world is committed. To state the logic of democracy necessitates an analysis of the process of solving a definite problem. The main characteristics already formulated are the concrete universality of judgment, the immediate value of purposive thought for the control of recurring crises, the rejection of a non-functional Absolute whether of fact or idea, and the fundamentally social nature of impulse and endeavor. Democracy, then, as a logical method, signifies the continued use of a constructive hypothetical procedure in the solution of social problems. A progressive democracy is based upon the conviction that the constant factor persisting in the midst of change is not immutable entities of any kind, but a function—a furthering of the life-process by ceaseless interpretation and redirection.

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